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I. INTRODUCTION

Indeed, it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person
for purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not
for purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse.'
Should a woman who abuses drugs while pregnant be punished under
criminal child abuse laws for endangering the life of her fetus? Most courts,
including four state high courts, have refused to allow the prosecution of a mother

Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
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for prenatal drug use.2 On July 15, 1996, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
became the first state high court in the nation to determine that a woman can be
criminally liable for conduct during pregnancy that endangers the life of her fetus.3
The recent decision by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Whither v.
State4 marks the first time that a state has defined the term "child," as used in a child
abuse and endangerment statute, to include viable fetuses.' The majority opinion
expands upon South Carolina's established law which recognizes the viable fetus
as a person for the purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes. 6 With
the Whither decision, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has made an
unprecedented determination that a mother may be held criminally liable for
endangering her child's life through prenatal drug use.7
This Case Comment will examine the controversial decision of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina in Whither v. State. It will also discuss the possible
implications of the majority's holding as more women are prosecuted for threatening

2 See Stephanie Stone, Conduct During Pregnancy Harming Fetus May Be Prosecuted,South

CarolinaHigh Court Holds, West's Legal News, July 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 405681; see
also Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky.
1993); Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d
710 (Ohio 1992).
3 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *1.
4 Id.

5 Id. at *1.
6

Id. at *3.

7 Id. at *1. Although South Carolina is the first state to uphold the prosecution of a mother for
prenatal drug use under a child endangerment law, Wisconsin recently decided to prosecute a mother
under an attempted homicide statute for similar conduct. See Status of Fetus at Issue in Court:
Woman Who DeliveredDrunk Baby ProtestsAttempted Homicide Charge, WIs. ST. J., Sept. 6, 1996,
at 3B. On September 18, 1996, in the Circuit Court of Racine County, Racine, Wisconsin, Judge
Dennis Barry declared that 35-year-old Deborah Zimmerman would be tried for the attempted
homicide ofher newborn child. See Rivera Live: Wisconsin Woman Chargedwith Attempted Murder
After Trying To Kill Her Baby by Becoming DangerouslyDrunk in Her Ninth Month of Pregnancy
(CNBC news broadcast, Sept. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Rivera Live]. Zimmerman drank alcohol
throughout her pregnancy and reportedly told a nurse that she wanted to kill her baby. See Mom Wants
Reunion with Baby Born Drunk, Wis. ST. J., Sept. 6, 1996, at 7A. Zimmerman's child was born with
a blood-alcohol level of 0.199, which is nearly twice the legal limit. Id. This is the first prosecution
of a woman for attempting to kill her fetus by binge drinking. Rivera Live, supra.
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the lives of their children by engaging in prenatal drug use.8
HI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 20, 1992, Cornelia Whitner pled guilty to criminal child neglect
for causing her baby boy to be born with cocaine metabolites in his system by
reason of Whitner's ingestion of crack cocaine during the third trimester of her
pregnancy. 9 The circuit court judge sentenced Whitner to eight years in prison for
violating South Carolina's child abuse and endangerment statute." Whitner did not
appeal her conviction."
Following her conviction and after serving almost two years in jail, Whitner
filed a petition for Post Conviction Relief (PCR), pursuant to title 17, chapter 27,
section 20 of the South Carolina Code, alleging that the circuit court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to accept her guilty plea.'2 Additionally, Whitner claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon her lawyer's failure to advise her that
the child endangerment statute might not apply to prenatal drug use. 3 Circuit Court
Judge Larry
R. Patterson granted Whitner's petition on both grounds and the state
14
appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the word "child"
as used in the child abuse and endangerment statute includes viable fetuses;
therefore, the sentencing court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept Whitner's

' See Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, PregnantSubstance Abusers: A Problem That Won't Go
Away, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 623, 639 (1994) (citing Kary Moss, Recent Development, Substance Abuse
During Pregnancy,13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 278, 279-89 (1990) (discussing the growing trend to
prosecute women for drug use that endangers their fetuses)); see also Julia Epstein, The Pregnant
Imagination,FetalRights, and Women's Bodies: A HistoricalInquiry, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 139,
141 (Winter 1995) (noting the recent trend toward criminalizing the behavior of pregnant women in
relation to their gestating fetuses).
I Whither, 1996 WL 393164, at *1.
10

Id.; see S.C. CoDEANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (amended June 18, 1996) (effective

Jan. 1, 1997); see supra text accompanying note 18.
Whitner, 1996 WL393164, at*1.
Id; see also Respondent's Brief at 1, Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15,
1996).
12

" Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *1; Respondent's Brief at 1, Whitner (No. 24468).

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *1; see also Whitner v. State, No. 93-CP-39-347 (S.C.C.P. Pickens
County Nov. 22, 1993) (order granting post-conviction relief).
14
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plea because criminal child neglect includes an expectant mother's use of crack
cocaine after the fetus is viable. 5 The South Carolina court further held that
Whitner's lawyer's failure to advise her of the statute's inapplicability was not
ineffective assistance of counsel. 6
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

The Whitner opinion discussed the scope of South Carolina's child abuse
and endangerment statute contained in title 20, chapter 7, section 50 of the South
Carolina Code.17 In pertinent part, this section states that:
[i]t is unlawful for a person who has the legal custody of a child or
helpless person, without lawful excuse, to refuse or neglect to
provide the proper care and attention, as defined in Section 20-7490, for the child or helpless person, so that the life, health, or
comfort of the child or helpless person is endangered or is likely to
be endangered.'"
This section further provides that a person who violates its provisions "is guilty of
a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined in the discretion of the court or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."' 9
The Whitner opinion did not discuss South Carolina case law interpreting
the child abuse and endangerment statute. Instead, the court focused on its prior
holdings regarding the rights held by viable fetuses.2" Three decisions guided the
majority: Hall v. Murphy,2 Fowler v. Woodward,22 and State v. Horne 3 In Hall,

15

16

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *1.
Id. at *7.

17Id. at*1.
I8

S.C. CODE ANN.§ 20-7-50.

19 Id.

20 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *1.

21113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960).
- 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964).
2' 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
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the Supreme Court of South Carolina was asked to determine whether the State's
wrongful death statute would apply in an action brought on behalf of an infant who
died shortly after birth as a result of injuries sustained prenatally when the child was
viable.24 The action in Hall grew out of a collision between an automobile and a
bus.' A passenger riding in the automobile prematurely gave birth to a child that
lived only four hours because of injuries sustained in the collision.26 The parents of
the child brought an action against the driver of the bus for the pain and suffering
and wrongful death of the child.27 Because a fetus was thought to have no separate
being apart from the mother, the driver in Hall argued that a viable fetus was not a
"person" within the meaning of South Carolina's survival and wrongful death
28
statutes.
After the Hall court reviewed case law from other states concerning the
applicability of wrongful death statutes to viable fetuses, the majority determined
that "the reasons assigned by the courts for holding that a child after birth may not
maintain an action for prenatal injuries were unsound, illogical and unjust."'29 Thus,
24Hall, 113 S.E.2d at 791. One of the actions the parents brought in Hall was under South Carolina's

1952 wrongful death statute. S.C. CODEANN. § 10-1951 (Law. Co-op. 1952) (current version at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). Today, the wrongful death statute states in
pertinent part that:
[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of another and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages
in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person
injured, although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
make the killing in law a felony.
S.C. CODEANN. § 15-51-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
2' Hall, 113

S.E.2d at791.

26 Id.

' Id. The action for "pain and agony" was brought under South Carolina's survival statute to recover
damages for the alleged pain suffered by the child in the four hours she lived. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10-209 (Law. Co-op. 1952).
2 Hall, 113 S.E.2d at 791. (citing S.C. CODEANN.

§ 10-209 (Law. Co-op. 1952); S.C. CODEANN.

§ 10-1951 (Law. Co-op. 1952)).

Id. at 793. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (holding that
a cause of action could not be maintained for an unborn child's wrongful death). Dietrich appears to
be the first case in the United States to determine the right of an unborn child to recover damages for
1953) (summarizing the reasons behind the
atort. See also Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412,415 (I11.
divergent views regarding the applicability of wrongful death statutes to viable fetuses). Some of the
reasons assigned by courts in refusing to allow a child to maintain an action for prenatal injuries
29
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the majority found "no difficulty in concluding that a fetus having reached that
period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its
mother is a person. 3 °
Four years later in Fowler v. Woodward,3 the Supreme Court of South
Carolina interpreted Hall as supporting a finding that a viable fetus injured while in
the womb need not be born alive for another to maintain an action for the wrongful
death of the fetus. 32 Fowler involved an action brought for the wrongful death of
an unborn, viable infant who perished with its mother in an automobile collision and
ensuing fire.33 Because the complaint failed to allege that the infant was born alive
and died thereafter as a result of the injuries complained of, the court was asked to
determine whether the complaint stated a cause of action for recovery under the
wrongful death statute.34
The Fowler court repeated Hall's finding that the unborn child, after
viability, is a distinct being capable of sustaining a legal wrong. 35 The Fowler court
accepted Hall's reasoning and held that
[s]ince a viable child is a person before separation from the body
of its mother and since prenatal injuries tortiously inflicted on such
a child are actionable, it is apparent that the complaint alleges such
an 'act, neglect or default' by the defendant, to the injury of the
child, as would have entitled the child 'to maintain an action and
36
recover damages in respect thereof... if death had not ensued.'
Moreover, although the injurious consequences of a prenatal injury may not become
include: the lack of precedent; the difficulty of proof of a causal relation between the injury and the

damage which subsequently becomes apparent; the assumed single identity of mother and unborn
child; and, the absence of any duty to a fetus. Hall, 113 S.E.2d at 793. The Hall court felt such
reasons were unsound in light of existing medical knowledge. Id.
30

Hall, 113 S.E.2d at 793.

31 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964).
32See Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at*2 (S.C. July 15, 1996); Fowler, 138 S.E.2d

at 44.
33 Fowler, 138 S.E.2d at 42.
34 Id. at 42-43

(citing S.C. CODE ANN.§ 10-1951 (Law. Co-op. 1962)).

31 Id. at 43.
36 Id. at 44.
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apparent until long after birth, the Fowler court found no difficulty in holding that
a cause of action for tortious injury to such a child arises immediately upon the
infliction of the injury.37 Thus, the Fowler decision expanded the rights of viable
fetuses even further by finding that an injured infant need not be born alive for
another to maintain a wrongful death action for the loss of that child.38 The Whitner
majority emphasized that the Fowler decision made it clear that Hall was based on
the concept of the viable fetus as a person with vested legal rights.
This
conclusion, that a viable fetus has legal rights independent of its mother, would
eventually influence the Whitner majority's own finding.
Next, in 1984, the Supreme Court of South Carolina was again asked to
examine the rights of viable fetuses; this time, however, the court had to decide
whether criminal liability applied to the killing of a viable human being. In State
v. Home, the defendant stabbed his wife, who was nine months pregnant, in the
neck, arms, and abdomen.4 ' Although the mother survived the attack, the child was
dead when removed from the mother's womb.4 2 Later, an autopsy indicated that the
child had experienced normal development and had died as a result of suffocation
caused by the mother's loss of blood.43
Although no South Carolina decision had held that the killing of a viable
human being in utero could constitute criminal homicide, the court had previously
addressed the crime of infanticide, which required proof that the infant was born
alive.44 The Home court found that, although the child was an unintended victim
of the defendant, the defendant was criminally liable for the child's death under the
doctrine of "transferred intent." ' Citing Fowler, the court determined that "[i]t
would be grossly inconsistent for us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the

37 Id.

Fowler, 138 S.E.2d at 44.

38

3' Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *2 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
40

See State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).

4,Id. at 704.
42

Id.

43

Id.

Id. at 704 (citing State v. Collington, 192 S.E.2d 856 (S.C. 1972); State v. O'Neall, 60 S.E. 1121
(S.C. 1908)).
14

41 Home, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
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purposes of imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a similar classification
'
in the criminal context."46
Thus, in a unanimous decision, the court held that an
action for homicide could be maintained in the future when the state could prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the fetus involved was viable.47
IV. THE DECISION

In reviewing the PCR court's finding that the circuit court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to accept Whitner's guilty plea, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina was forced to consider the scope of the child abuse and
endangerment statute." In doing so, the Whitner court briefly examined the legal
rights and privileges held by viable fetuses, ultimately deciding that those rights
could be further expanded.49 Specifically, the court held that the word "child" as
used in the abuse and endangerment statute would include viable fetuses.5"
Therefore, Whitner was not convicted of a non-existent crime, as she had argued,
and the circuit court had jurisdiction to accept her guilty plea.5 Consequently, the
court found that Whitner's lawyer's failure to advise Whitner of the statute's
inapplicability did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.52 Finally, because
Whitner failed to present her constitutional arguments to the PCR court below, the
majority held that Whitner could not raise them for the first time on appeal."
South Carolina Associate Justice Toal wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Waller and Burnett. Chief Justice Finney and Associate Justice Moore each
46 Id. (citing Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964)).
47 Id.

48

Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *I (S.C. July 15, 1996).

49

Id. at*1-3.

'o Id. at *3.
5' Id. at *2-3.
52 Id. at *7. Whitner based her ineffective assistance of counsel claim on her lawyer's failure to

inform Whitner that section 20-7-50 did not apply to prenatal drug use. Whitner, 1996 WL 393164,
at *7. Whitner contended that she would not have pled guilty to criminal child neglect had she been
given such advice. Id. Because the majority believed that section 20-7-50 would apply to maternal
drug use after the fetus is viable, the court could not find that Whitner's lawyer's failure to advise her
of the statute's inapplicability constituted deficient performance. Id. The majority believed the
lawyer's advice was justified. Id.
" Id. at *7.
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wrote separate, dissenting opinions challenging the majority's unprecedented
decision and expressing reservations about the majority's lack ofjudicial restraint.'
The conflicting opinions reflect the difficulty courts face when asked to determine
the applicability of child endangerment laws to cases of prenatal substance abuse.
A.

The Majority Opinion

In Whitner v. State, the Supreme Court of South Carolina determined the
scope of the state child abuse and endangerment statute as it applied to a baby born
with injuries resulting from the mother's ingestion of crack cocaine during the third
trimester of her pregnancy. 5 The majority opinion analyzed the subject matter
jurisdiction issue in the following manner: First, the court considered the language
of the child abuse and endangerment statute, as well as the purpose for the
legislation. 6 Next, the court discussed controlling South Carolina case law that set
forth certain legal rights and privileges held by viable fetuses. 7 Finally, the
majority addressed Whitner's arguments against defining "child" so broadly58 and
challenged the dissents' contention that the majority's finding was inconsistent with
prior case law and with statutory construction.5 9
1.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The majority first addressed the PCR court's finding that the sentencing
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept Whitner's guilty plea.6
According to South Carolina law, a circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
accept a guilty plea to a non-existent offense.6' Thus, in order for the sentencing
court to have jurisdiction to accept Whitner's guilty plea, a mother's prenatal use of
crack cocaine after the fetus is viable would have to be included as criminal child

4 Whither, 1996 WL 393164, at *7-10 (Finney & Moore, JJ., dissenting).
5 Id. at*1.
16

Id. at*1.

5 Id. at *2-3.
58Id. at*3-5.
'9

Whither, 1996 WL 393164, at *6.

60

Id. at *1.

6,

Id. at *1-2. See Williams v. State, 410 S.E.2d 563 (S.C. 1991).
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neglect under section 20-7-50.62 As the court explained, all other issues would be
ancillary to the jurisdictional question.63
a.

Statutory Interpretation

In deciding whether criminal child neglect would include an expectant
mother's use of crack cocaine after the fetus has reached viability, the majority
looked to the precise language used in section 20-7-50.' Because the state was
contending that section 20-7-50 encompassed maternal acts that endangered or were
"likely to endanger the life, comfort, or health of a viable fetus," the Whitner
majority was faced with deciding whether a viable fetus constituted a "person" for
the purpose of the South Carolina Children's Code.'
The majority began its statutory interpretation by noting that the court's
primary function was first to ascertain the intent of the legislature.66 The court
explained that where a statute is complete, plain, and unambiguous, legislative intent
can be determined from the language used in the statute itself. 67 The majority
further remarked that it must consider the language of section 20-7-50 in
conjunction with the purpose of the whole statute and the policy of the law.68
Additionally, there is a basic presumption that the legislature knows of prior
legislation and of judicial decisions construing that legislation when subsequent
statutes are enacted concerning related subjects.69

b.

Controlling South Carolina Case Law

After examining the language of the child endangerment statute, the

62

Whitner, 1996 WL393164, at *2.

63 Id. at *2.

Id. at *1; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50.
65

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *1; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-30(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985)

(defining "[c]hild" as a person under the age of eighteen).
6 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at * 1.
67 Id. (citing State v. Blackmon, 403 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 1991)).
68 Id. at *1. (citing South Carolina Coastal Council v. South Carolina State Ethics Comm'n, 410

S.E.2d 245 (S.C. 1991)).
69

Id. (citing Berkebile v. Outen, 426 S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 1993); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316 (1953)).
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majority continued its analysis with a summary of legal rights and privileges that
South Carolina recognizes as being held by viable fetuses.7' Specifically, South
Carolina has acknowledged a viable fetus to be a "person" for the purposes of
wrongful death 7' and homicide statutes! 2 The majority looked to its prior decisions
in Hall, Fowler, and Home for guidance.7'
Against this backdrop of South Carolina case law, the Whitner majority
determined that there was no rational basis for finding that a viable fetus is not a
person in the context of the child abuse and endangerment statute.74 Particularly, the
majority reasoned that "it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person
for purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of
statutes proscribing child abuse."75 In addition, citing to its decision in Hall, the
majority noted that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "person" has not
changed in any way that would now deny viable fetuses status as persons. 76
The Whitner majority further pointed out that the policies enunciated in
South Carolina Children's Code also support its "plain meaning" interpretation of
the word "person" as it appears in section 20-7-50.77 South Carolina's policies
concerning children are set forth in title 20, chapter 7, section 20(C) of the South
Carolina Code, which expressly states that "it shall be the policy of this State to
concentrate on the prevention of children's problems as the most important strategy
which can be planned and implemented on behalf of children and their families. 78
Noting that the abuse or neglect of a child at any time during childhood can
exact a profound toll on both the child and society as a whole, the Whitner majority
explained that the consequences of abuse which take place after birth "often pale in
70Id. at *2-3.
" Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *2-3; see Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964); Hall v.
Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960).
7

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *2-3; see State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).

' See discussion supra part III.
74 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *3.
7

id.

76Id.; See Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960). The Whitner court felt that its holding in Hall

rested primarily on the plain meaning of the word "person" in light of existing medical knowledge
concerning fetal development Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *3.
7

id.
Id. (citing S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
I7
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comparison to those resulting from abuse suffered by the viable fetus before birth."'7 9
Thus, the Whitner majority decided that the code's policy of prevention would
support a reading of the word "person" to include viable fetuses.8" Furthermore,
because title 20, chapter 7, section 20(B) of the code expressly states that its policies
apply "to all children who have need of services," the majority insisted that the
scope of the Children's Code is quite broad.8' The court felt that, together with the
comprehensive remedial purposes of the code, this language would support the
inference that the legislature intended to include viable fetuses within the scope of
the code's protection.82
c.

Response to Respondent's Arguments

Upon finding that the word "child" would include a viable fetus, the
Whitner majority continued its analysis by addressing each of Whitner's major
arguments against defining "child" so broadly. First, the court discussed Whitner's
argument concerning the introduction of several bills in the South Carolina General
Assembly which had addressed substance addiction by pregnant women.83 Whitner
suggested that the introduction of bills whose passage would have criminalized
substance abuse by pregnant women evinces a belief by legislators that prior
legislation had not addressed the issue.84 Specifically, Whitner argued that the
introduction of such bills proves that section 20-7-50 was not intended to encompass

79 Id.

80 Id. at *3.

8' Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
82

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *3.

8 Id. Whitner argued that the South Carolina legislature has considered and explicitly rejected the
interpretation of section 20-7-50 to include viable fetuses. Id. Whitner noted that several bills had
been introduced which would have mandated reporting a woman's prenatal drug use and redefined an
"abused child" to include newborns exposed prenatally to drugs. Id. Specifically, Whitner noted that
one bill, S. 4023 (1993), would have made it a crime for a pregnant woman to ingest a controlled
substance and House Bill 4486 (1994) would have amended section 20-7-50 to include "a woman who
is pregnant" and "fetus[es]." Id. However, as Whitner argued, none of these bills had passed. See
Respondent's Brief at 18-19, Whitner (No. 24468).
84 Respondent's Brief at 18-19, Whither (No. 24468).
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abuse or neglect of a viable fetus.'
The majority dismissed Whitner's emphasis on prior proposed legislation
and explained that, generally, the legislature's subsequent acts "cast no light on the
intent of the legislature which enacted the statute being construed."86 Rather, the
majority felt its best guide to discerning legislative intent was to first look to the
language of the statute.87 Because the majority believed that the statute's meaning
was evident from the language, it saw no reason to look beyond the words of section
20-7-50.88 Moreover, the majority insisted that South Carolina's existing case law
supported its conclusion about the meaning of the statute.89
The majority went on to discuss Whitner's contention that an interpretation
of the statute to include viable fetuses would lead to absurd results not intended by
the legislature.9" Whitner argued that if the court interpreted "child" to include
viable fetuses, every action by an expectant mother that endangers or is likely to
endanger a fetus, whether the action is legal or not, would constitute unlawful
neglect under the statute. 9' For instance, Whither claimed that a woman could
ultimately be prosecuted for smoking or drinking during pregnancy because these
behaviors have been known to endanger fetuses.'
Whitner argued that the
legislature never intended such "absurd" results, and therefore the statute should not

Id. The State argued that although the legislature was aware that the court had construed "person"

to include a viable fetus in both the civil and criminal context; and although the legislature recently
considered making changes to the statute to reflect new law, the legislature had taken no steps to
exclude a viable fetus from the definition of "person" used in section 20-7-50. Id. Thus, the state
presumed that the legislature intended that its definition of "person" remain consistent with the existing
law of the state - that the term "person" encompasses viable fetuses. See Reply Brief of Petitioner,
at 2, Whitner (No. 24468).
86 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *3. (citing Home Health Servs., Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of

Health & Envtl. Control, 379 S.E.2d 734, 736 n.1 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989)).
87

Id.

88 Id.

" Id.; see State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C.
1964); Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960).

'0 Whither, 1996 WL393164, at *4.
91 Id.
92Id.
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be construed to include viable fetuses.93
The majority disagreed with Whitner, citing two specific reasons in
opposition. First, the majority determined that the same arguments against the
statute could be made whether or not the child were born.94 The majority noted that
after the birth of a child, a parent can be prosecuted under section 20-7-50 for an
action that is likely to endanger the child whether or not the action itself is illegal.95
The majority explained that, under certain circumstances, a parent who drinks
excessively could be guilty of child neglect or endangerment even though the act of
consuming alcoholic beverages is itself legal.96 The majority believed that the
legislature clearly did not think it "absurd" to allow prosecution of parents for
otherwise legal acts when the acts actually or potentially endanger the "life, health
or comfort" of the parents' born children; thus, the majority reasoned that such a
result should not be rendered absurd by the mere fact that the child at issue is a
viable fetus.97
In addition, Justice Toal felt that the majority need not address the potential
"parade of horribles" set forth by Whitner.98 Because Whitner admitted to having
ingested crack cocaine during the third trimester of her pregnancy, causing her child
to be born with cocaine in its system, the majority decided that, in the case at hand,
certain facts were clear." Conceding that the precise effects of maternal crack use
during pregnancy are somewhat unclear, the majority asserted that it is well
documented and within the realm of public knowledge that such drug use can cause

91 Id. at *4.
94 Id.

9s Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *4.
96 Id.
97

Id.

9 Id. Whitner argued that if the state's interpretation of section 20-7-50 were correct, "every action

by a pregnant woman that endangers or is likely to endanger a fetus, whether otherwise legal or illegal,
would constitute unlawful neglect under the statute." Id. For instance, any pregnant woman who
drinks alcohol could be charged for harming the fetus she is carrying due to fetal alcohol syndrome.
Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *4. A pregnant woman could also be arrested for smoking cigarettes.
Id. Also, a woman could be arrested for failing to take proper medication or to follow her doctor's
instructions, potentially causing harm to the fetus. See Respondent's Brief at 20, Whitner (No. 24468)
(citing Tolliver v. State, No. 90-CP-23-5178 (S.C.C.P. Greenville County, Aug. 10, 1992)).
" Whitner, 1996 WL393164, at*4.
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serious harm to a viable fetus.' 0 Therefore, the majority determined that there could
be no question that Whitner endangered the life, health, and comfort of her child.'0 '
The Whitner majority dismissed Whitner's arguments which addressed
holdings from other states that were in conflict with the majority's decision. First,
the majority acknowledged the many decisions from other states holding that
maternal conduct before the birth of the child would not give rise to criminal
prosecution under child abuse and endangerment statutes.0 2 Although no state has
held that a mother is criminally liable for maternal conduct that endangers the life
of a fetus, many of the cases cited by the Whither court were prosecuted under state
statutes forbidding delivery or distribution of illicit substances to minors, rather than
under child endangerment statutes.0 3 Thus, because the prosecutions in such cases
depended upon the statutory construction of the terms "delivery" and "distribution,"
the Whitner
° majority believed that such cases were inapplicable to the present

situation."

Additionally, the majority believed that the cases concerning state child
endangerment statutes or construing the terms "child" and "person" were also
distinguishable because those states had entirely different bodies of case law than
South Carolina. 5 For instance, the majority noted Commonwealth v. Welch, 6 in

"o Id. (citing Joseph J. Volpe, Effect of Cocaine Use on the Fetus, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399 (1992)

(explaining that cocaine use during pregnancy can cause retardation and prematurity, major alterations
in fetal brain structure and in neurologic, cognitive, and behavioral functions); see also Lisa M. Noller,
Taking Careof Two: Criminalizingthe Ingestion of ControlledSubstancesDuring Pregnancy,2 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 367, 369 (1995) (citing Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During

Pregnancy: Court-OrderedMedical Treatments andLegal Penaltiesfor PotentiallyHarmful Behavior
by PregnantWomen, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666-67 (1990) (discussing the connection between substance
abuse during pregnancy and serious mental and physical defects in newborns)).
t Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *4.
I2Id. (citing State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla- Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carter, 602 So. 2d
995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977); State v.
Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991);
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993);
Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d
710 (Ohio 1992); Commonwealth v. Kemp, 643 A.2d 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)).
03

Id.; see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga.

Ct. App. 1992).
104Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *4.

105Id.
'0 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 99, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:311

which the Supreme Court of Kentucky specifically stated that Kentucky law had not
construed the word "person" in the context of the criminal homicide statute to
include a fetus. 10 7 Furthermore, in Reyes v. Superior Court,"' the California Court
of Appeals noted that, under California law, a fetus was not recognized as a "human
being" within the purview of its murder and manslaughter statutes; therefore, it
would be improper to determine the fetus was a "child" for the purposes of the
felonious child endangerment statute. 109
The Whitner opinion continued to dismiss the holdings from other states
with an analysis of Commonwealth v. Pellegrini,1" a Massachusetts Superior Court
decision which held that a mother pregnant with a viable fetus could not be
criminally liable for transmitting cocaine to the fetus."' The Whitner majority
devoted a good part of its opinion to distinguishing the Pellegrinidecision from its
own because Massachusetts has a body of case law that is "substantially similar" to
that of South Carolina." 2 Justice Toal's opinion noted specifically that, as in South
Carolina, Massachusetts law allows wrongful death actions on behalf of viable
fetuses injured in utero who are not subsequently born alive." 3 Also, Massachusetts
permits homicide prosecutions of third parties who kill viable fetuses." 4
In Pellegrini,the Massachusetts Superior Court found that the state's drug
distribution statute did not apply to the distribution of an illegal substance to a viable

107 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *4 (citing Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, at 281 (Ky.

1993)).
'0o141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977).
'09 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164 at *4 (citing Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App.
1977)).
"1oCommonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Plymouth County Oct. 15, 1990).
"I1

Id.

112

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *5.

"

Id. (citing Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975)).

"" Id.; see Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984) (holding that a viable fetus is a
person for the purposes of a vehicular homicide statute and that the infliction of prenatal injuries
resulting in the death of a viable fetus, before or after it is bom, is homicide); Commonwealth v.
Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989) (following Cass and holding that a viable fetus is a human
being for the purposes of the common-law crime of murder).
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fetus."' The statute at issue in Pellegriniproscribed the distribution of cocaine to
persons under the age of eighteen." 6 The court in Pellegrini determined that a
viable fetus was not a "person under the age of eighteen" for the purposes of the
statute." 7 Because of this finding, the Massachusetts Superior Court had to
distinguish Massachusetts case law which had held viable fetuses were "persons"
for the purposes of state criminal laws."'
The court in Pellegrinidistinguished its decision from prior Massachusetts
holdings by explaining that Cass and Lawrence grant "legal rights to the unborn
only where the mother's or parents' interest in the potentiality of life, not the state's
interest, are sought to be vindicated."" 9 The Whitner majority reasoned that this
interpretation meant that in Massachusetts, a viable fetus should only be accorded
the rights of a person for the sake of its mother or both its parents; thus, under this
rationale, the viable fetus lacks rights of its own. 2 ' While Whitner would have liked
the Supreme Court of South Carolina to construe its decisions in Hall,Fowler,and
Horne in a manner that would only accord rights to the viable fetus when doing so
would protect the special parent-child relationship, the Whitner majority refused to
interpret the South Carolina decisions so narrowly.'
The majority concluded its analysis of Pellegriniby explaining that if the
Massachusetts Superior Court decision accurately characterizes the rationale

"5 Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 13-14 (Mass. Super. Ct. Plymouth County Oct.

15, 1990) (holding that the interpretation of the state drug distribution statute to include the in utero
transfer of cocaine from a mother to her fetus is an inappropriate exercise of judicial power and that
due process principles prevent the court from applying the statute to cases of prenatal drug use).
6 d. at 3, n. 1. Massachusetts lav states that:

[a]ny person who knowingly or intentionally manufactures, distributes, dispenses
or possesses with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled
substance in Class B [sic] of section thirty-one to a person under the age of
eighteen years shall be punished by a term of imprisonment in the state prison for
not less than five nor more than fifteen years.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 94C, § 32F(b) (1995).
"

Pelligrini,No. 87970, slip. op. at 10.

"t

Id. at 10-13.

" Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The Pellegrini court determined that the Massachusetts cases were
limited to vindicating a mother's or parents' interest against third-party wrongdoing and did not
attribute legal rights to the fetus as against its mother. Id.
"' Whitner, 1996 WL393164, at *5.
121 id.
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underlying Mone, Lawrence, and Cass, then the reasoning of those cases is
substantially different from the reasoning behind similar South Carolina cases. 2 '
Primarily, the Whitner majority noted that similar South Carolina cases were
decided on the basis of the meaning of "person" as understood in the light of
existing medical knowledge, rather than based on the policy of protecting the
mother-child relationship. 2 Particularly, the Home decision, which involved a
homicide statute, rested on the State's interest in vindicating the life of the viable
fetus, not on the mother's interest 24 Also, the majority emphasized that the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that states have a compelling interest in
the life of a viable fetus." z The majority further reasoned that if it were to read
Home only as a vindication of the mother's interest in the life of her unborn child,
then there would be no basis for prosecuting a mother who kills her viable fetus by
stabbing or shooting it, yet a third party could be prosecuted for the same acts.'26
The majority refused to follow the Pellegrini decision and declined to construe
Home in a way that would insulate a mother from all culpability for harming her
viable child.'27
2.

Constitutional Issues

The Whitner majority concluded its decision with a brief reference to
Whitner's constitutional arguments.
Specifically, Whitner argued that the
application of the child endangerment statute to her situation would violate her

122

id.

123 Id.
24 Id.; see also discussion supra part III.
125 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *5; see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(reaffirming the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that a State testing requirement to determine the viability
of a fetus before performing an abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy was constitutional
where the requirement was reasonably designed to ensure that abortions were not performed after the
fetus is viable); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that the State has a compelling interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life once a fetus has reached viability).

26 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *5.
127

id.
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constitutionally-protected rights of privacy and due process.' 28 The majority quickly
dismissed Whitner's contentions by noting that none of these constitutional
arguments were raised to the PCR court.'29 All the arguments before the PCR court
involved the scope of section 20-7-50.3 0 Thus, because Whitner failed to raise the
constitutional issues below, Whitner could not raise them before the appellate court
for the first time. 3 '
Ultimately, the majority's analysis led it to conclude that the child abuse and
endangerment statute encompasses viable fetuses and that Whitner had in fact
endangered her child's life by ingesting crack-cocaine in her third trimester of
pregnancy.3 2 Accordingly, the majority reversed the decision of the PCR cour?3
B.

The DissentingOpinions
In separate dissents, Chief Justice Finney and Justice Moore respectfully

'2 See Respondent's Brief at 27-42, Whitner (No. 24468). In particular, Whitner argued that the new
definition of "child" cannot be applied retroactively because criminal statutes must give fair notice of
the conduct proscribed. Id. at 27-29. Additionally, Whitner argued that according to the constitution,
privacy rights protect women from being forced to terminate wanted pregnancies and from measures

penalizing them for carrying such pregnancies to term. Id. at 30. Whitner asserted that the court's
interpretation of section 20-7-50 would intrude into pregnant women's lives by attempting to reach
and deter behavior during pregnancy. Id. at 31. Also, Whitner contended that such an interpretation
implicates a woman's right to bodily integrity and her right to be let alone. Id. Because Whitner failed
to raise these arguments to the PCR court below, the majority refused to rule on their substance.
Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *7.
29 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *5. The PCR judge's Final Order makes no mention of these

constitutional arguments, and the record did not reflect any motion under Rule 59(e) of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend or alter thejudgment, Id.
130Id. at *7, *10 n.6. The majority stated that it was able to find only one instance in which counsel

even arguably raised the constitutional issues now before the court. Id. at *10 n.6. The court noted
that Whitner's counsel vaguely commented on the right of privacy; however, Whitner's lawyer did
not get into the argument. Id. The majority refused to hear the constitutional arguments because it did
not feel Whitner's counsel's passing statement was enough to raise the issues. Whitner, 1996 WL
393164, at *10 n.6. Furthermore, the PCR court's Final Order made no mention of constitutional
issues and Whituer's counsel failed to preserve them for the record. Id.
13' Id. at *7; see Plyler v. State, 424 S.E.2d 477 (S.C. 1992) (holding that an issue
not raised before
PCR court will not be considered on appeal).

112

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *7.
id.
I33
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disagreed with the majority's result and raised doubts about its reasoning. 3 1
Specifically, Finney's dissent expressed concern at the majority's failure to define
"child" in the context of the entire statute, as well as its failure to consider the
statute's intended purpose.'35 Moreover, Finney challenged the majority's reliance
on civil wrongful death and common law feticide decisions, arguing that the
Code or to the
majority should have referred to decisions under the Children's
36
1
construction.
statutory
of
rules
applicable
and
language
statutory
Additionally, Justice Moore's dissent focused on the legislature's failure to
pass proposed bills addressing the problem of drug use during pregnancy; Moore
believed that this failure indicates that the child endangerment statute is not intended
to apply to cases like Whitner's' 3 7 Describing the majority's analysis as "strained"
and their construction of the statute as "overinclusive," Justice Moore's dissent
argued against the majority's failure to exercise judicial restraint. 3 '
1.

Chief Justice Finney's Dissent

Chief Justice Finney began his dissent by noting that section 20-7-50 applies
to a "person having legal custody of any child or helpless person" who unlawfully
neglects that child or helpless person.'39 Finney also stated that because this is a
penal statute, it is strictly construed against the state, in favor of the respondent. 4
The dissent continued its opinion with a look at title 20, chapter 7, section
30(1), which defines "child" as a "person under the age of eighteen."'' The dissent
contended that the Whitner holding is inconsistent with the Supreme Court of South
Carolina's holding in Doe v. Clark.'42 The dissent believed that the court's decision
in Clark, construing another provision of the Children's Code, stands for the

'4 Id. at

*7-10 (Finney & Moore, JJ., dissenting).

135Id. at *8 (Finney, C.J., dissenting).
136

Id.

117

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *9 (Moore, J., dissenting).

"s Id. at *9-10.
"39
Id. at *7 (Finney, C.J., dissenting).
'4' Id. (citing

41 Id. (citing

142

State v. Blackmon, 403 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 1991)).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-30(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985)).

457 S.E.2d 336 (S.C. 1995).
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proposition that "child," within the context of section 20-7-50, means a "child in

being and not a fetus."' 43 However, the Whitner majority stated that rather than
interpreting section 20-7-50, Clark turned on the specific language in the consent
provisions of the Adoption Act, codified in title 22, chapter 7, sections 1690 and
1700 of the South Carolina Code.'"
Clark involved a mother who, while pregnant, signed a consent form
allowing the Does to adopt the child upon birth; however, after the child was born,
the mother wanted to keep the baby and argued that the consent she executed was
void because it did not comply with statutory requirements. 45 A trial court found
that the consent was valid and the mother appealed. 46 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court, holding that under the adoption
statutes, the natural mother's consent to the adoption must be given after the birth
47

of the child.1

In response to Finney's claim, Justice Toal asserted that the finding in Clark
was not based on defining "child" as including only born children. 4 Rather, the
Whitner majority reasoned that the court had defined "child" in such a way because
section 20-7-1700(A)(3) requires the consent form to contain the date of birth of the
adoptee, and the date of birth requirement obviously could not be fulfilled until after
the child's birth.' 4 9 Also, section 20-7-1690 provides that consent is required of "the
mother of a child born when the mother was not married."'"5 In view of these code
sections and of the definition of "child" set forth in the Children's Code, the Clark

court concluded that a natural mother could not consent to adoption until after the

'41

Whither, 1996 WL 393164, at *7-8.

'"

Id. (citing S.C. CODEANN. §§ 20-7-1690, -1700 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995)).

145

Id.

146Clark, 457 S.E.2d at 336.
"'

Id. at 337 (citing S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-1690(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995)).

141

Whither, 1996 WL 393164, at *6.

Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1700(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (stating that "[c]onsent
or relinquishment for the purpose of adoption, pursuant to § 20-7-1690, must be made by a sworn
document, signed by the person or the head of the agency giving consent or relinquishment, and shall
specify the following:... (3) the date of birth, race, and sex of the adoptee and any names by which
the adoptee has been known.").
141

0 Whither, 1996 WL 393164, at *6; see also S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-1690(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1995) (stating that "[c]onsent or relinquishment for the purpose of adoption is required of the following
persons: ... (3) the mother of a child born when the mother was not married.").
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birth of her child.' 5 ' The Whitner majority further emphasized that its decision in
Clark did not find that the term "child" excludes viable fetuses. 152 Despite the
majority's view, however, the dissent believed that the court ignored Clark's limited
holding. 53
Finney further argued that the majority was mistaken in failing to review tile
statute in its entirety and to consider the statute's intended purpose."
Finney
contended that section 20-7-50 does not impose criminal liability on every person
who neglects a child, but only on a "person having legal custody" of that child. 55
Finney believed the concept of legal custody to be inapplicable to a fetus; thus, the
legislature could not have contemplated section 20-7-50's application to maternal
56
conduct during pregnancy. 1
Moreover, Finney argued that section 20-7-50's reference to title 20, chapter
7, section 490 for the definition of neglect further implies that the legislature could
not have meant the child endangerment statute to apply to the situation at hand. 7
Under section 20-7-490, the vast majority of acts which constitute neglect may only
be directed against a child, not towards a fetus.'58 Therefore, Finney claimed that
the reliance upon section 20-7-490 in section 20-7-50 is further evidence that the

" Doe v. Clark, 457 S.E.2d 336, 337 (S.C. 1995).
152

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *6.

153 id.

"5Id. at *8 (Finney, C.J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 447 S.E.2d 859
(S.C. 1994) (holding that when construing a statute, the court does not view its terms in isolation, but
rather in the context of the entire statute and its intended purpose)).
15

Id.
I56
Id. (citing Stone v. State, 443 S.E.2d 544 (S.C. 1994) (holding that statutes are construed so as to

avoid absurd results)).
117

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *8.

...
Id. (Finney, C.J., dissenting); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(B) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (stating that
an "'[a]bused or neglected child' means a child whose physical or mental health or welfare is harmed
or threatened with harm, as defined by items (C) and (D) of this section, by the acts or omissions of
his parent, guardian or other person responsible for his welfare."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(C)-(D)
(Law. Co-op. 1985) (describing "harm" as being when a parent, guardian or other person responsible
for the child's welfare (1) inflicts physical or mental injury upon the child; (2) commits a sexual
offense against the child; (3) fails to supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or
education; (4) abandons the child; or (5) encourages or approves of the commission of delinquent acts
by the child).
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term "child" as used in the child endangerment statute does not encompass a fetus.'59
Chief Justice Finney completed his dissent by explaining that the majority's holding
only suggests that the term "child" is ambiguous. 6 Finney warned, that such an
ambiguity must be resolved in respondent's favor. 6'
The majority directly addressed Justice Finney's implication that the court
ignored South Carolina's rule of lenity requiring the court to resolve any ambiguities
in a criminal statute in favor of the defendant 62 The Whitner majority believed that
the dissent was mistaken in its understanding of the holding. 63 First, the majority
stated that it did not believe the rule of lenity applied because the statute was not
ambiguous." 4 The majority further defended its ruling by explaining that its
interpretation of the statute was based "primarily on the plain meaning of the word
'person' as contained in the statute," rather than on unrelated prior case law. 65 The
court had reviewed its rationale in Hall, Fowler, and Home to support its reading
of the statute." 6 Although the Whither majority concluded its analysis of the subject
matter jurisdiction issue by stating that "both statutory language and case law
compel the conclusion" it reached, Chief Justice Finney vehemently disagreed.167
2.

Justice Moore's Dissent

Justice Moore also disagreed with the majority's finding and wrote
separately to express specific concerns about the decision.'6 8 Particularly, Moore's
dissent focussed on the legislature's failure to pass proposed bills which would have

'"5 Whitner, 1996

WL 393164, at *8.

160 id.
161

id.

162

Id. at *6; see also State v. Blackmon, 403 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 1991).

'6'

Whither, 1996 WL 393163, at *6.

'A

Id.

165Id.
16GId.
167 Id. at *8.

168

Whitner, 1996 WL 393163, at *9 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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addressed the problem of maternal drug use during pregnancy." Moore suggested
that the failure of such legislation to pass shows that the child endangerment statute
is not intended to apply to prenatal drug use. 70 At the very least, the "legislature's
failed attempts to enact a statute regulating a pregnant woman's conduct indicate the
complexity of the issue.' 17 1 In addition, Moore cautioned that the court should not
invade what is the sole province of the legislative branch; Moore believed that the
majority not only ignored legislative intent, but had embarked on a course rejected
by every other court that has addressed the issue.l72
Moore explained that the majority should not have looked further than the
language of section 20-7-50 to discern legislative intent and reiterated Finney's73
argument that "legal custody" is not a qualification which applies to a viable fetus.'
Moore contended that the majority rendered the statute vague by construing it to
include conduct not contemplated by the legislature and placed itself in the position
of determining what conduct is unlawful under section 20-7-50.'" 4 Justice Moore
further explained that although the majority dismissed the issue as not before it, it
was unrealistic to ignore the "down-the-road" consequences because of the import
of the decision - a decision that could potentially render a pregnant woman
criminally liable for "myriad acts which the legislature has not seen fit to
criminalize."' 75
169

Id.

170 id.
171 Id.

Id. The PCR court decision, issued by Judge Larry R. Patterson, also held that:
[i]t is not for this court to decide whether taking illegal drugs during pregnancy
should make a mother liable for child abuse. Whether including fetuses within
our child abuse laws would deter pregnant women from seeking medical treatment
or would, on the contrary, deter them from taking illegal drugs in the first place
is an important question. But it is just the type of question that the Legislature
must decide.
Whitner V. State, No. 93-CP-39-347 (S.C.C.P. Pickens County Nov. 22, 1993) (order granting postconviction relief); see also supra note 102 (discussing courts that have addressed the issue of
prosecuting women for conduct during pregnancy).
m Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *9.
'I4 Id. Moore's dissent also reflected Whitner's "parade of horribles" argument when the justice asked
whether a pregnant woman's failure to obtain prenatal care, failure to take vitamins and eat properly,
or failure to quit smoking or drinking would constitute unlawful conduct under the court's
interpretation of section 20-7-50. Id.; see also Respondent's Brief at 20, Whitner (No. 24468).

'

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *9 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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Describing the majority's construction of the child endangerment statute as
"overinclusive," Moore stated that the only law specifically regulating the conduct
of a mother toward her fetus in South Carolina is the abortion statute. 76 Moore also
explained that if section 20-7-50 applies only when a fetus is "viable," a pregnant
woman could use cocaine for the entire first twenty-four weeks of her pregnancy,
yet could be immune from prosecution if she stops using drugs once the fetus
reaches viability." Moore argued that now a pregnant woman may be sentenced
up to ten years in prison for ingesting drugs during pregnancy, whereas she can have
an illegal abortion and receive only a two-year sentence for killing her viable
fetus.'7978 Moore concluded that such an inconsistency cannot be justified under the
law. 1
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHITNER

The effects of the Whitner decision will likely be significant. In South
Carolina, the decision has set precedent and has opened the door for the state to
prosecute women who abuse drugs during pregnancy. Also, South Carolina courts
must now determine what types of substances abused by pregnant women will result
in criminal penalties under section 20-7-50. Other states may choose to follow
South Carolina's lead and find that similar child endangerment laws encompass
viable fetuses. As litigation continues, states will ultimately be asked to determine
the due process and right to privacy issues involved in this controversy. However,
courts may simply choose to ignore the Whither ruling, and leave this important
issue for state legislatures to decide. In sum, the implications of the Whither
decision will depend upon how other states address the many arguments that
surround this controversy.
The arguments on either side of this controversy are persuasive. For
instance, arguments in support of the prosecution of women for prenatal substance
abuse often center around a state's compelling interest in protecting the life and

6 Id.;

see also S.C. CODEANN. § 44-41-20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (stating that a woman may legally

abort a viable fetus if necessary to preserve her health, while she may not justify the death of a child
in being on this ground).
'7

Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *9 (Moore, J., dissenting).

178

Id.

179 Id.
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health of its unborn children. 80 Additionally, some advocates may assert that unlike
the fundamental right to have an abortion, a woman does not have a fundamental
right to abuse drugs during pregnancy.' 8' States that try to prosecute women for
prenatal drug abuse may believe that by charging pregnant women with child
endangerment, women will be deterred from unlawful drug use and will be
encouraged to seek treatment for their drug-addiction.' 82 Other courts could uphold
the prosecution of women for prenatal substance abuse simply out of a belief that
a child has a legal right to begin life without the burden of injuries inflicted prior to
birth.'83 Moreover, some may contend that a mother has an affirmative duty of care
to ensure that her child is born free from injuries."
The arguments against prosecuting women for prenatal drug abuse are
equally compelling. For instance, many courts have refused to uphold such
prosecutions citing a lack of legislative intent.'85 Such prosecutions would also
"o See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482 (1983) (holding that one limiting
interest on a woman's right to have an abortion is the state's compelling interest in the life and health
of the viable unborn child).
"' See, e.g., State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 714 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, J., dissenting). Wright's dissent
in Gray focuses on the fact that a woman does not have a fundamental right to abuse cocaine. Id. In
Justice Wright's opinion, the act of using cocaine is not an act relating to a right connected with
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, or child bearing. Id. Moreover, Wright argued
that no special protection is afforded the cocaine abuser just because she is pregnant. Id. Instead,
Wright felt that in such cases the court must balance a woman's desire to use illegal drugs, while she
happens to be pregnant, with the health and welfare of her child. Id. The Gray dissent stated that such
cases are not about a woman's choice to conceive or carry a child. Gray, 584 N.E.2d at 714 (Wright,
J., dissenting). They are about the right of a child to be born healthy. Id.
"8See, e.g., Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994) (rejecting State's
argument that charging women with child endangerment for the transmission of illegal substances
through the umbilical cord provides a strong deterrent against unlawful drug use by pregnant women
and encourages them to seek drug treatment); see also Noller, supra note 100, at 387 (arguing that if
more women believed ingesting hazardous substances while pregnant would result in imprisonment,
more would discontinue drug use).
1"3 Noller, supra note 100, at 387 (citing John A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the Control of
Contraception,Pregnancy,and Childbirth,69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437 (1983)).
814 See, e.g., Gray, 584 N.E.2d at 713 (Wright, J., dissenting). Wright stated, "I am satisfied that a
woman who knowingly abuses cocaine while pregnant violates a duty of care to her unborn child and
thus endangers that child when this action results in a substantial risk to the health and safety of that
child following birth." Id.

1'5 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992) ("We find that the legislative history
does not show a manifest intent to use the word 'delivery' in the context of criminally prosecuting
mothers for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor by way of the umbilical cord.").
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establish an indefinite number of new crimes, creating uncertainty in the law.'86
Additionally, expanding child abuse laws to encompass viable fetuses would violate
due process rights because the laws would not give women fair notice of their
reach.187 Furthermore, some courts that have refused to extend child abuse or drug
distribution statutes to mothers who abuse drugs while pregnant have felt that to do
so would likely discourage substance-addicted women from seeking the prenatal
care and the substance abuse treatment necessary to deliver a healthy child. 8 Some
could argue that prosecuting a woman for prenatal drug abuse places the mother and
child against one another as adversaries, affecting the inherent bond between a
mother and her child.'89 Finally, it can be argued that the criminal prosecution of
women for prenatal drug use does not promote healthy births because such
prosecutions typically occur after pregnancy. 9 '
Because the preceding arguments are so compelling and because the
Whitner court addressed only a few of them on their merits, the Whitner decision
appears to be premature. In addition, South Carolina must eventually decide the
constitutional issues inherent to this controversy. Although the implications of this
landmark ruling remain to be seen, one may argue that the Whitner court approved
what amounts to be the governmental "policing" of a pregnant woman's conduct.
One may also predict that such governmental intrusion will not withstand a
"" See, e.g., Encoe, 885 P.2d at 598 (citing Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky.
1993) (finding that if child endangerment statutes were applied to women during pregnancy, such
statutes would be unlimited in scope and would create an indefinite number of new crimes. Such an
interpretation might lead to a "slippery slope" whereby the law could be construed to cover the full
range of a pregnant woman's behavior. This would be a plainly unconstitutional result that would,
among other things, render the statutes void for vagueness)).
187 See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993) (holding that if child abuse
statutes were construed to apply to cases of prenatal drug abuse, such statutes would lack fair notice
and violate constitutional due process limits against statutory vagueness).
188

See, e.g., id. at 284 (quoting the legislative intent found in the Matemal Health Act of 1992).

Kentucky's General Assembly felt that education and treatment were essential strategies in preventing
prenatal exposure to drugs. Id. Punitive actions taken against pregnant substance abusers would create
additional problems, such as discouraging these women from seeking the essential prenatal care and
substance abuse treatment necessary to healthy childbearing. Id.
"' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990);

Page M. Linden, DrugAddiction DuringPregnancy: A Callfor Increased SocialResponsibility, 4
AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 105, 120 (1995) (explaining that criminal prosecution in this context is faulty
because it constitutes an adversarial rather than facilitative approach and does not focus on maintaining
the mother-child relationship).
19' See Linden, supra note 189, at 120 (explaining that post-birth legal responses do not prevent harm

to a child caused by prenatal substance abuse).
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constitutional inquiry. For now, however, South Carolina's child abuse and
endangerment statute encompasses viable fetuses. Accordingly, substance-addicted
pregnant women in South Carolina may now be prosecuted for child endangerment.
VI. CONCLUSION

With the Whitner decision, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has taken
an unprecedented step and expanded child abuse and endangerment laws to
encompass viable fetuses who are injured as a result of prenatal substance abuse.
Now, a woman in South Carolina may be prosecuted under criminal child neglect
laws for abusing drugs during pregnancy if her fetus has reached viability.
However, it is unlikely that a pregnant woman's self-abuse will change as a result
of the Whitner court's holding.
Children born with drug addictions or with drug-related injuries make a sad
statement about our society as a whole. Despite the Whitner court's decision,
imposing criminal sanctions on the mothers of these children is not the answer. The
only effective way to reach a woman's behavior during pregnancy is through
education, drug treatment, and prenatal care - not through criminal prosecution.
Stephanie L. HainerOjeda*
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